Introduction
We have been asked to provide general comments on our colleague's paper entitled, 'How to win a WTO dispute based on non-WTO Law'.
As the title suggests, the primary focus of Joost Pauwelyn's paper is to examine how and in what circumstances non-WTO can be applied by World Trade Organization (WTO) panels in disputes. In examining this issue, Pauwelyn distinguishes the following two types of situations, which in our view arc nevcrtheless related: (1) whcrc non-WTO law leads a panel to decline jurisdiction and (2) where non-WTO law justifies what would otherwise be a violation ofWTO law.
In the first situation, Pauwelyn argues that panels and the Appcllatc Body should decline jurisdiction whcn WTO Members have bilaterally agrccd to set aside the jurisdiction of the WTO dispute seUlement over WTO-rclatcd disputes and cach timc another inter-na~iomtl tribunal has been set up to resolve a dispute or has already rulcd on a similar matter pm·suant to another treaty provision.
In our view, in arguing that WTO panels should decline jurisdiction when another trcaty also grants jurisdiction, which disregards the compulsory and automatic nature of the WTO dispute seulement system and, in creating unnecessary conf1ict of norms that facilitates pushing disputes outsidc the ambit of WTO law, Pauwelyn misconstrues fundamental aspects of the WTO dispute scttlement system and overlool<s the successful results of the Umguay Round negotiations, where States (i.e., WTO Members) agreed to construct a more rule-based international trading system, primarily through the present dispute settlement system. ln allowing WTO panels and the Appellate Body to recognizc such treatieswhich we suggest may be considcred contrary to the automatic nature1 of the WTO dispute settlement system -one of the implications of Pauwelyn's thcsis is that it would leavc weaker trading partncrs in the bands of more powerful States, capable of imposing other jurisdictional mechanisms that arc Jess impartial, comprehensive and rule-orientated than that of the WTO dispute settlement system.
In the second situation, Pauwelyn argues that in sorne instances, WTO adjudîcating bodies should find, on the merits of a dispute, that there is no WTO violation whcre non-WTO law preva ils over WTO law. In reaching this conclusion, Pauwelyn suggests a very broad definition of conflict of nonns and pro vides severa! examples of possible conflicts between WTO provisions and other international obligations. Pauwelyn broadens the notion of conf1ict of notms by încluding conflicts between rights and obligations or exceptions under Article XX of GA TT 1994. He also contends that WTO relations are bilateral by nature and therefore, two Members can agree to derogatc from provisions of the WTO. Then, Pauwelyn suggests that WTO panels and Appellatc Body are required to resolve any and ali conflicts that may exist between WTO provisions and othcr international obligations and rights of States when they are involved in a WTO dispute. Ostcnsibly, for Pauwelyn, identifying conflicts appears to ensure that panels and the This term refers lo the so-called negative consensus rule set out, inter alia, in Article 6.1 of the DSU, whereby all Members present al a DSB meeting, including the complainant requesting the establishment of the panel, decide by consensus not to establish a panel.
pcllatc Body are able to adjudicate the issue objectively as weil as respecting international law. In our view, Pauwelyn's perspective overlooks the nature and the state of public intcmational law at present. States arc bound at all times by all thcir international obligations and must always respect the rights of other States. Moreover, States must also negotiate and apply thcir intemational obligations in good faith at all times. Although Pauwelyn dacs acknowledge in his papcr that it would be cxccptional if a harmonious interpretation of WTO law and non-WTO law was not possible and the latter provided an 'independent dcfcnce' to a violation of the WTO trcaty, wc are of the vicw that WTO law and other provisions of international law can gcncrally be applied harmoniously and effectively through good faith interpretation.
Even though WTO panels and the Appcllatc Body cannat interpret and enforce non-WTO law, other than to the extent necessary to intcrpret and apply WTO provisions, one should not underestimate the potential coherence that exists bctwccn WTO law and the other systems of international law. Wc believe Pauwelyn overemphasizes the role of conflict of norms in resolving WTO disputes. Patrwelyn ignores the 'chaotic' nature of international law and seeks to compartmentalizc cach system of international law in such a manner that almost assures that conflicts will be created as issues often ovcrlap bctween different sub-systems of international law.
If Pauwelyn's argument is acccptcd, it would grant a specialized tribunal, such as a WTO panel, powers for which it has not been conferred or possess the capacity to address. More importantly, instead of favoring an evolving coherence and mutual respect between intcmational legal systems, Pauwelyn's viewpoint would rcquirc the WTO dispute seUlement system and other international tribunats to compartmentalize, separate and dissociate functions and duties contraty to their overlapping mandates. This cannat be correct. Although no one would argue that the WTO is not an important intemational organization, it is not a world governmcnt and its dispute settlcment system even Jess so.
II. Where Non-WTO Law Leads a Panel to Decline Jurisdiction
WTO panels are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have a delegated and limited jurisdiction. Therefore, panels must comply with the mandate received from WTO Membcrs through the Dis-pute Scttlement Body (DSB). Pursuant to Articles XXII and XXIll of GATT 1 994 and the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) Members have dclegated to panels and the Appellate Body the power to adjudicate their disputes and make recommcndations to the DSB. The parameters of this delegation and the jurisdiction of the WTO adjudicating bodies are determined by the DSU and the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO. This may explain why GATT/WTO jurisprudence has cstablishcd that panels and the Appellate Body may still rule on the WTO compatibility of measures that have been removed during proceedings. For instance, in Argentina -Textiles and Apparel, Argcntina had changed the leve) of its statistical tax during the proceedings. The Appellate Body nevertheless examined the leve! of the tax as it was at the time the Panel was cstablished:
'At the ti me the Panel proceeding commenced, there was in effect in Argentina an ad valorem tax of 3 percent on imports, without a minimum or a maximum charge, which was callcd a 'statistical tax' and was described as designed to caver the cast of providing a statistical service intendcd to provide a reliablc data base for foreign trade operators. i i According to Argentina's statement at the oral hcm·ing on 23 February !998 , this ad valorem statistical tax was modified to 0.5 percent in Decembcr 1997 .' 2 Likewisc, in US -Certain EC Products, the Appellate Body concluded that although the measure at issue was no longer in existence, it nonethcless found that the measure was inconsistent with Article II: l of GA TT 1994. However, since the measure was no longer in existence, no recommendation could be made to the DSB.
3 Other panels and the Appellate Body have analyzed and reached conclusions on measurcs removed or modified at the time of their mlings.
4 This is further evidence, as claborated below, that WTO adjudicating bodies have a dcfined and limitcdjurisdiction. (a) not make a determination to the em~ct that a violation has occurred, thal beneiits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute seUlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the iindings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding; (b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine !he reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and (c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the leve] of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within thal reasonable period oftime.' Agreement (RT A) provision be sufficient to stop the au toma tic nature of the WTO dispute settlcment system? How can Article 23 and the automatic nature of the DSU be reconciled with the preference and, in sorne circumstances, the exclusivity given to the RTA dispute settlement process concerning obligations which are similar in the R TA and in WTO for the same facts? Pauwelyn argues that if a RT A panel has ru led on a matter between the parties, the WTO panel shou ld decline to rule on the similar WTO claim; and that if the RTA process is ongoing, the WTO process should be haltcd. Although we would do not in principle disagree with Pauwelyn's suggestion, it does not reflect the present state of international law.
Rather, it is our view that in light of the auto matie nature of the mechanism, once a dispute is initiated under the DSU, it is unlikely that a WTO panel would give any consideration to the respondent's rcquest to hait the procedures just bccause similar or related procedures are being pursued undcr aRTA. Parties could de facto not bring the matter to the WTO, but we think that it would be diftïcult for a WTO panel to refuse to hear a WTO Member complaining about a measure claimed to be inconsistent with the WTO Agreement on the ground that the complaining or rcsponding Membcr is allegcd to have a more specifie or more appropriate defcnce or remedy in another forum concerning the same legal facts. In practice, the WTO panel will most likely read and consider the related RT A mling(s) and may even use it to con.firm its own interpretation of the WTO provisions and thcir application to the matter at issue. However, to decline jurisdiction bccause aRTA dispute mling has already been rendercd or ongoing is a totally different matter.
In initiating a parallel WTO dispute, a RTA party may be found to be violating the obligation under the RTA not to initiale a dispute outside the RTA. In thcse circumstanees, the RTA patty opposed to the parallel WTO panel (the 'opposing RTA party') would claim that the WTO panel initiated by the other RT A party is impairing sorne of its benefîts tmdcr the RTA. The opposing RTA party would arguably win this claim beforc the RTA panel. Theorctically, that opposing RT A party would then be entitled to sorne retaliation, the value of which could probably correspond to (part of) the bcnefits that the other RTA patty could gain in initiating its WTO panel. In other words, even if it may not be practical or useful for a RT A party to duplicate a dispute thal should be dcalt with in RTA, therc would be no legal obstacle against such a possibility, since, legally speaking, the RT A tribunal and WTO panel would be considering different 'matters', and diiTcrcnt 'applicable law' in mechanisms that offcrs different remedies, implementation and enforcement rules. 6 There could be an overlap or contlict of jurisdiction between the dispute seUlement mechanism of the WTO and that of RTAs. The wording of Atticle 23 of the DSU seems to make it clear that a WTO adjudicating body always has the authority (and even the obligation) to examine claims of violations ofWTO obligations. WTO rights and obligations can be challcnged only pursuant to the WTO dispute settlement procedures and only beforc a WTO adjudicating body. 7 In addition, WTO jurisprudence has decided that any WTO Member that is a 'potcntial exporter' has the sufficicnt legal interest to initia te a WTO panel process. 8 That is to say, in the context of a dispute between two WTO Mcmbcrs involving issues covcred by both an RTA and the WTO Agreement, any WTO Mcmber which considers that any of its WTO benefits have been nullified or impaircd has the absolute right to trigger the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and to requcst the establishment of a panel on this matter.9 Such a WTO Member cannot be askcd (and arguably cannot even agree) to take its WTO dispute to another forum, even if that other forum appears to be more relevant or bctter equippcd to deal with the issues involved.
Tensions may also arise from the availability of RT A noncompulsory dispute settlcment mechanism with no binding effect even in the absence of strict de jure cont1icts (but when faced with overlaps of jurisdictions). For instance, trade mcasurcs takcn pursuant to non-compliance with an RTA adjudication process coule! be 6 However, it is worth pondering on the potential issue of how a WTO arbitralion panel would deal wilh retaliation already enforced under the North American Free Trade Agreement if the potential WTO retaliation is to be exercised on the same trade f1ows.
7
Even an arbitration pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU would be a WTO arbitration, and thus covered by the exclusivity provision of Article 23 ofthe DSU. 
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( emphasis added) There may be situations where two Members agree not to bring one or severa! disputes to the WTO. However, if a Member brings a dispute to the WTO, contrary to a bilateral agreement or to an exclusive jurisdiction clause in another treaty, that Mcmber will probably argue that the bilateral agreement or the exclusive jurisdiction clause is not applicable or does not cover the matter at issue before the WTO on the bases that the applicable law, the remedies available and the cnforcement mechanisms, etc. are not the same. Thus, a panel would need to examine the substance of the cl ai ms of WTO violation to assess whether and how they overlap with the provJstOns of the bilateral agreement or the treaty. After all this work, it is doubtful that in the present state of international law, a panel would simply decline jurisdiction and rule that another judicial or quasi-judicial body is the most appropriate forum to examine the issue, or has already solved the dispute. Moreover, in the absence of an agreement among states, the princip le of forum non conveniens seems not to be applicable in the present state of internationallaw.12
The same holds truc for an allegation based on the principle of res judicata. Wc agree with Vaughan Lowe that there is no such general principle yet applicable between international tribunals. 13 Also, wc doubt that the establishment of the WTO has changed this situation. Furthermore, it would also be very difficult for the principle of res judicata to find application in the context of WTO dispute settlement between an international tribunal and a WTO panel, as the notion of 'matter. '. 20 In other words, the issue was what effect does the agreement have on the ability of a Mcmber to subsequently request the establishment of a panel. We believe that this is one of those instances where basic general principlcs of proccdural law could be cmploycd by a panel in a future dispute to detennine whcther a mutually agrced solution negatively affects the procedural rights of a complainant in such a way that it bars that Member's ability to 're-litigate' on a matter that bas alrcady bccn scttlcd. In other words, as suggested by the Panel in Jndia -Autos, a panel could apply the principle of estoppel in such circumstances.
21 Wc also hasten to add that this interpretation would be one in which a panel would be authorized to makc undcr A1iiclc 11 of the DSU.
Since WTO panels arc obliged to presume that WTO Members comply with their international law obligations, they should interprct and apply WTO law accordingly. Moreover, since WTO panels and the Appellate Body are quasi-judicial they must, and do comply with basic general princip les of proccdurallaw. Both panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted and applied Article 11 of the DSU to encompass general principles of proccdural law and duc proccss mles, which have evolved into rules on the burden of proof, on the representation of parties before panels, standing, judicial economy and so forth. Here, we generally agree with Pauwelyn's assertion that, 'as important as those processcs of references to non-WTO law may be, it is unlikely they determine the substantive outcome of a WTO dispute [ ... ] applying the Im·gcly procedural mies of general international law may cventually decide a case, but hardly influences its substantive merits. ' Finally, it is also worth citing the following excerpt from Jndia -Autos, where the Panel implies that it is not necessarily interpreting and applying non-WTO law (i.e., a non-covered agreement) when examining a mutually agreed solution: '[ ... ] These possibilities suggest that the issue cannat nccessarily be resolved simply through an acknowlcdgement that an MAS [mutually agreed solution] is not a covered agreement as was argued by the EC. That argument simply is another way of noting that the DSU does not cxprcssly give a panel a mandate to consider whcthcr a 'violation' of such an agreement might exist as a distinct basis for a dispute under the DSU. It does not necessarily prove that a panel may not in somc circumstances need to considcr the terms of such agreed solutions in order to fuifil! its duties under the DSU. Here the Panel notes that disputes concerning the application of the D SU itse1f can be t~e abject of proceedings under the DSU. This might possibly includc disputes concerning mutually agreed solutions, since these are expressly referred to in the DSU.'
22

III. Where Non-WTO Law Justifies What Would Otherwise Be a Violation ofWTO Law
Before discussing the relatîonship between WTO law and general international law and the alleged capacity of WTO adjudicating bodies to assess Mcmbers' compliance with non-WTO trcaty provisions, one must understand the manner in which the WTO dispute settlement process functions. ln many ways, the WTO dispute scttlemcnt system is an attractive forum to settle disputes for States that are members of the WTO as it can be triggercd fairly easily and quickly. Also, another appea1ing feature is that panels and the Appellate Body are expected to rcnder relativcly quick decisions. Virtually any allegation would gcnerally suffice to fonnally trigger the WTO dispute seUlement process through a simple request for consultations in writing, copied to the DSB. Ali Members are presumed to have an economie and legal interest to initiate a WTO dispute settlemcnt mechanism. 23 As noted above, once triggcrcd, the WTO dispute scttlement system is automatic in view of the so-called negative consensus rule found in Article 6.1 DSU. As previously mentioned, Article 23 of the DSU is arguably one of the most fundamental provisions of the DSU. One of the unique features of the WTO is that it bas managcd to rcgulate and limit unauthorized unilateral countermeasures from powerful Members. The WTO system of law contains, inter alia, specifie: (1) rights and obligations (2) cl ai ms and causes of action (3) violations (4) enforcement meehanisms and (5) remedies in case of violation. The DSU defines the jurisdiction, the capacity and the mandate of panels (and the Appellate Body) with reference to (1) allegations of WTO violations by the complaining party(ies) (2) the specifie type of remedies/conclusions that panels and the Appcllatc Body may recommend and (3) the prohibition not to add to or diminish WTO law. Indeed, paragraph 1 of Article 23 of the DSU has becn interpreted as bcing an ' exclusive dispute settlement clause'.
·
The mandate of panels and the Appellate Body is to determine whcthcr provisions of the WTO 'covered agreements' have been violated. Pm·suant to Article 1.1, the DSU applics to disputes brought undcr the covered agreements. The covered agreements listed in Appcndix l of the DSU arc all the WTO multilateral trade agreements, (exeept the Trade-Relatcd Review Mechanism) and the plurilateral agreements, to the extent that Members have adopted the latter. The covcrcd agreements would also include WTO decisions and secondary legislation. Article 4 provides that consultations can be initiated on allegations of violations of any of the covered agreements. Atticle 7.1 states that the mandate of the panel is '(t)o examine, in the light of the relevant provisions in (namc of the covered agreement(s) cited by the parties to the dispute), the matter refetTed to the DSB by the Member in document [ ... ] and to make such findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommcndations or in giving the rulings provided.for in thatlthose agreement(.\)' (emphasis added). Aliicle 7.2 adds that 'Panels shaH address the relevant provisions in any covered agreement or agreements citcd by the parties to the dispute' (emphasis added). Article 11 of the DSU also provides for a limitcd jurisdiction for panels, which is circumscribed by the covered agreements. Tt requircs a panel to 'make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such othcr findings as will assist the DSB in making recommendations o r in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements' (emphasis addcd).
Final! y, 28 See the ru ling of the Chairman in United States -Margin of Preferences, 9 August 1949, BISD lill 1 to the effect that a bilateral agreement cannot be enforced by a GATT Panel. The issue of the WTO compatibility of a regional trade agreement with WTO provisions, including Article XXIV, is not really different since, should panels have wide jurisdiction to assess the overall compatibility of regional trade agreements, panels would still be examining whether a Member's specifie measure or its regional trade agreement with other Members is compatible with the WTO agreements, taking into account the possible exceptions authorized by Article XXIV. In all cases panels would not be 'enforcing' the provisions of the regional trade agreement, something thal could be done by the parties to the regional trade agreement only pursuant to the dispute seUlement procedures of the regional trade agreement itself. On the relationship Moreover, in EC -Bananas ill, the Appellate Body upheld the panel's decision that it 'had no alternative but to examine the provisions ' of a non-WTO agreement 'in so far as it is neccssary' to interprct WTO rules (the Lomé waiver rcfcn·ed to the Lomé Convention and the panel was cxamining the scope of the Lomé Waivcr). 29 The implication is that the role of non-WTO instruments is limited to interpreting the non-WTO rule to ex te nt necessary to decide the matter at hand. Similarly, a panel may be callcd upon in the future to examine the Kimberley Certification Schemc for rough diamonds -a non-WTO agreement -'in so far as it is necessary ' to interpret the scope of the Kimberley Waiver 30 which refers to the Kimberley Certification Scheme.
Having said that the WTO adjudicating bodies have a limited jurisdiction -to interpret and apply the covered agreements -does not mean that the WTO should be interpreted and applied in isolation from the rest of international law. In its first report, USGasoline, the Appellate Body noted that the WTO agreements must not be interpreted in 'clinicat isolation' from public international law. ln a nutshell, the mandate of panels and the Appellate Body is defincd and limited: to intcrprct WTO law and decide whether a provision of the covcrcd agreements has been violated. ln doing so they apply and enforce the WTO law. ln accordance with their respective mandates, the WTO panels and the Appellate Body only have the jurisdiction to interpret and apply WTO law. As such, they cannot interpret, let atone reach any legal conclusions of violation or compliance with other treaties or customs in complete isolation from the covcred agreements. If and when they do so, it is only to the extent necessmy to interpret provisions of the covered agreements.
As mentioned abovc, WTO panels and the Appellate Body must presume that WTO Mcmbers comply with their international law obligations and therefore, they should interpret and apply WTO law accordingly. Moreover, sincc WTO panels and the Appellate now only in the institutional fi"amework of the WTO/DSB that the United States could obtain a WTO compatible determination thal the European Communities violated the WTO Agreement, and it is only in the institutiona1 framework of the WTO/DSB thal the United States could ob tain the authorization to exercise remediai action.' [footnote 170: 'Therefore, in the WTO context, the provision of Article 60 of the Vi enna Convention on the Laws of Treaties ( 1969) Body are quasi-judicial they must, and do comply with basic general princip les of procedurallaw. Pauwelyn, however, limits the scopc for a coherent interpretation bctween WTO provisions and non-WTO provisions. To do so, Pauwelyn asserts as 'conflicts' differences between treaty provisions. For instance, he considcrs that in situations whcrc a Mcmber invokes compliance with an Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) as justification under Article XX of GA TT 1994 for a brcach of a WTO rule, a 'conflict' may exist between the MEA and Article Xl of GATT 1994, which generally disallows trade prohibitions and restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, despite the existence and applicability of Article XX of GA TT 1994. Si nec Article XX of GATT 1994 explicitly allows Members to give priority to policics other than trade, including those policies affected by an MEA, it is erroneous to claim that there is conflict between a WTO rule that disallows trade prohibitions and restrictions and the MEA.
In international law, for a 'conflict' to exist between two treatics, three conditions have to be met. First, the treaties must have somc overlap in membership. Second, the treaties must cover the same substantive subject matter. Otherwise, there would be no possibility for conflict. Third, the provisions must conflict, in the sense that the provisions must impose mutually exclusive obligations.
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The general principle of good faith in the interpretation and application of treaties call for a presumption against conflicts. The presumption against conflict is especially reinforced in cases where separate agreements are concludcd bctwccn the same parties, since it can be presumed that they are meant to be consistent with one another in the absence of any evidence to the contrmy.
37
For a cont1ict to exist, it must be established that a provision of the WTO Agreement mandates an action that a provision of another treaty prohibits or vice-versa, when a provision of another treaty mandates an action that the WTO Agreement prohibits. The occurrence of such a situation would be quite rare. In fact, one would be required to demonstrate that compliance with the WTO necessitates violation of that other treaty.
In the WTO context, 38 the Appellate Body in Guatemala-CementI elaborated on the issue of the possibility of conflicts bctwcen the special or additional mles of procedures in Appendix 2 of the DSU with respect to anti-dumping disputes and the general provisions of the DSU and concluded as follows: '[ ... ] A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation whcre adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conjlict between them. An interpreter must, therefore, idcntify an inconsistency or a difference between a provision of the DSU and a special or additional provision of a covered agreement before concluding that the latter prevails and th at the provision of the DSU does not apply ,'
39
Conflicts are concemed with situations where two 'obligations' cannat be reconciled. If the issue is one in which a treaty contains a right and the other an obligation a conflict cannat exist. 'Rights' within a treaty and contained in othcr treaties, must also be respcctcd and enforced by States at all times. There is, however, no need to cxpand the concept of conflict as other ru les of international law ensurc the respect, and in some circumstance the primacy of provisions allowing for rights over other provisions imposing 'obli- In taking into account explicit 'rights' provided for (within a treaty or in anothcr trcaty), one may use the lex specialis derogat generah\· (lex .\pecialis) prineiple of interpretation which favours the application of a more specifie provision ovcr a general one. Thcrefore, it may emerge from the intention of the parties and in the application of the lex specialis principlc that a State exercises an express and more specifie right provided for in an earlier or later treaty, albcit appearing inconsistent with a subsequent or earlier treaty obligation drafted in general tcrms.
Contrary to Pauwelyn's argument, no conflicts exists between Article XX of GA TT and the basic market access provisions of the GATT (Articles I, II, III and XI). The Appellate Body has stated that, in assessing the interpretation and application of Article XX, there is a need to maintain a 'balance' between these provisions and has rcferred to this 'balance ' in tenns of weighing the 'rights and obligations' ofMembers under both sets ofthcse provisions.
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In increasing the number of possible conflicts, Pauwelyn gives the impression that the identification of a conflict or severa! conflicts would facilitate the adjudicatory duties of panels and the Appellate Body and ensure an objective resolution of the matter and the respect of international law. In expanding the jurisdiction of the are concluded between the same parties, since it can be presumed thal they are meant to be consistent with each other, failing any evidence to the contrary; see also Vierdag ( 1988) , 1 00; Jennings 1 Watts (1992 ), 1280 Fitzmaurice ( 1957), 23 7; and Sinclair (1984), 97. 41 Jenks (1953) .
42 See the Appellate Body Report on US ~-Shrimp, WT/DS58/ AB/R, para. 142.
WTO adjudicating bodies, and in encouraging them to resolve ali potential conflicts, Pauwelyn asks WTO panels and the Appellate Body to resolve issues that Members have not been able to rcconcile (or may not want to reconcile). Pauwelyn sccms to suggcst that in assessing potential conllicts, WTO panels and Appellate Body will be able to resolve the matter at issue more appropriately than if it limits itself to interpreting the WTO provision coherently with othcr regimes of internatîonallaw. This cannat be correct. Even in a rare occasion of conflict bctween two treaty provisions, determining which of the two provisions supersedcs the othcr is not a simple exercise. The WTO adjudieating body would need to interpret the other treaty and decide whcthcr the WTO Member invoking it has eomplied with the procedural and substantive provision of that other treaty. But, wbat if, applying Pauwelyn's treaty contlict rulcs, a WTO panel reaches the conclusion that the non-WTO treaty should prevail, but that the WTO Member invoking such non-WTO treaty has not complied with procedural requirement(s) of that other trcaty. Should the WTO adjudicating body rule that the non-WTO provision prevails and that there is no WTO violation, dcspitc that Member's non-compliance with the procedural requirement(s) of the other treaty? ln our view, Pauwe!yn's approach creatcs more problems than solutions.
If the WTO applicable law cannot be interpreted so as to avoid conflict of norms with a provision of anothcr treaty, WTO adjudicating bodies would not be able to en force non-WTO provisions or give them direct effect in the WTO applicable law, if the outcome was that the superseding provision added to or diminished or even amended the rigbts and obligations in the covcred agreements. Setting as ide jus co gens, States do have the right to create judicial and remedy systems that would not be able to enforce ail international obligations of the same States. Consequently, these non-WTO norms arc binding on the same States (also WTO Members), and if States violatc them, they will be held responsible, but in another jurisdiction (and rules on State responsibility may apply). Botb systems of State responsibility opcrate in parallel; the WTO simply being a specifie one. Our approach simply rcllects the present state of international law which is characterized by an impcrfcct coherence between international legal regimes and jurisdictions exists.
Elsewhere, 43 Pauwelyn has also argued that Members arc prcsumed to have accepted the binding effect and the direct application of general international law into the WTO law. According to Pauwelyn, general international law can till in the gaps of the WTO trcaty and provisions of non-WTO trcatics that arc binding on the parties can be invokcd in defense of allcgcd WTO violations. lfthe relevant customary conflict rules dcmonstratc that a non-WTO rule must prcvail, 'then the WTO rule cannat be applied (and the defendant wins)'. For Pauwelyn, this would not result in 'requiring the WTO panel to judicially en force the other rule of international law' and 'the panel would not be 'diminishing' the rights of the complainants, as the complainant would have agreed to these conflicting ru les in the first place'. ln addition to being contrat-y to the wording of the DSU, Pauwelyn's suggestion would require WTO adjudicating bodies to interpret the other trcaty to decide on its compliance or violation by the eoncerned WTO Member and to draw legal consequences over and above the provisions of the WTO treaty. As previously stated, the WTO adjudicating bodies are not courts of general jurisdiction and they cannat interpret and apply all treaties involving WTO Members. The covered agreements are explicitly listed and it cannat be presumed that Mcmbers wanted to provide the WTO remediai system to enforce obligations and rights other than those listed in the WTO treaty. If they were to allow a non-WTO provision to supersede and set aside a WTO provision and therefore, give it legal effect and enforce a non-WTO provision in superseding a WTO provision, they would be adding or diminishing the WTO eovcred agreements (or even amending it). There is no evidence whatsoever to even suggcst that during the Uruguay Round the drafters of the WTO treaty ever wanted to providc non-WTO nonns with direct effect into WTO law and allow Members to benefit from free use of the WTO remedia] mechanism to cnforcc rights and obligations other than th ose of the WTO treaty. ln our view, Pauwelyn's position disregards the fact that no perfect coherence between international legal regimes cxists and thcrc is not yet a perfcct organisational coherence of international jurisdictions. Whcn faccd with imperfect sharing of international responsibilities, Pauwelyn ironically elevates WTO panels and the Appellate Body into a world dictator of sorts. Moreover, Pauwelyn overlooks that a solution to any eonflict between WTO rulcs and other non-WTO ru les should also talee into aceount the legal fact that sovereign States decided to agree to trade rules and an enforcement mechanism different from that of othcr international obligations. Whether this is good or bad, is a question beyond the seope of this paper.
Impmtantly, genuine situations of eontliet of nonns will oeeur very rarely and through good faith interpretation, WTO law and other provisions of international law ean generally be applicd harmoniously and effectivcly. Having said that WTO panels and the Appellate Body eannot intcrprct and en force non-WTO other than to the extent necessary to interpret and apply WTO provisions, one should not underestimate the coherence that already exists betwccn WTO law and the other systems of international law. lt is our suggestion that conflict of norms should continue to be construed narrowly. A broad definition of conflict would lcad to a result in which a third party (an adjudication body or a treaty interpreter) is confeJTed the power to set aside provisions that have been voluntarily ncgotiated by States.
IV. Conclusion
lt is important to cmphasize that States must at ail times comply with all thcir international obligations and respect the rights of other States.
The issue of WTO Members' State rcsponsibility for a violation of an international obligation or their obligation to respect other States' rights under treaties other than the WTO is not a matter for the WTO dispute settlement. It is important to recall that WTO Members rcmain responsible for the consequence of violations of their international obligations. In situations where a non-WTO treaty provision could potcntially supersede a WTO provision, but could not be dircctly applicable into the WTO legal system or enforced by WTO adjudieating bodies, the State invoking the non-WTO provision would still be able to invokc the application of the general international law mies on State responsibility against other States (also WTO Members) or other relevant systems oflaw for the violation of the non-WTO provisions. At the moment, in international law, there does not seem to be any complete co-ordination of systems of international law and there are severa! treaties on multiple and overlapping mattcrs. A single measure may violate a treaty and be consistent with another one. lt is thus possible to envisage a situation where an international tribunal would reach a conclusion that a measure (that is also [patt of] a WTO measure) is inconsistent with a (non-WTO) treaty, while the WTO adjudicating body may reach the conclusion that the same measure is consistent with the WTO treaty. As required under international law, the measure would have to be modified to comply with the non-WTO treaty law while continuing to be compatible with WTO law; and most of the ti me this should be feasiblc. The ruling of the WTO adjudicating body would only relate to the WTO aspects of the measure and would not affect or deal with the compatibility of the same measurc with the non-WTO treaty.
Various suggestions have been offered to try and 'constitutionalize' international courts and jurisdictions. We still believe that States' multiple international rights and obligations can be interpreted and applied harmoniously and coherently. In this regard, wc share the following perspective, that seems the most astute in the present state of international law:
'With the greatest respect to the past two Presidents of the International Comt, 1 do not share their view that the mode! of Atticle 234 (the renumbered Article 177) of the Rome Treaty provides an answer. It is simply cumbersome and unrcalistic to suppose that other tribunals would wish to refer points of general international law to the Intcmational Court of Justice. lndeed, the very rcason for their establishment as separate judicial instances militates against a notion of intra-judicial reference. The bctter way forward, in my view, is for us all to kecp ourselves well informed. Thus the European Court of Justice will want to keep abreast of the case law of the international Court, particularly whcn it deals with treaty law or mattcrs of customary international law; and the International Court will want to make sure it fully understands of the operation of a treaty under article 60 or to any question of responsibility which may arise for a State from the conclusion or application of a treaty, the provisions of which are incompatible with its obligations towards another State under another treaty.' the circumstances in which these issues arise for its sistcr court in Luxembourg [ .. .] . '
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In conclusion, despitc somc criticisms offered on OW' collcague's papcr, it should be borne in mind that wc grcatly appreciate yct another of his outstanding contributions to the field of public international law and WTO law as wcll as the relationship betwcen both. In the final analysis, howcver, Joost's assertion that the purpose of his paper is to take the relcvance of non-WTO law bcforc WTO panels a 'step further' is instructive, inasmuch as WTO panels should be reluctant, at present, to take that 'step further' .
